Pearson Edexcel Level 3 GCE

Friday 7 June 2024

Afternoon (Time: 1 hour 30 minutes)

Paper reference **9HI0/2G**

History

Advanced

PAPER 2: Depth study

Option 2G.1: The rise and fall of fascism in Italy, c1911–46

Option 2G.2: Spain, 1930–78: republicanism, Francoism and the re-establishment of democracy

Sources Booklet

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Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 2G.1: The rise and fall of fascism in Italy, c1911–46

Sources for use with Question 1.

Source 1: From a telegram sent by the German ambassador in Rome to the German Foreign Office, 31 July 1914. Italy was in the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria. Here the German Ambassador comments on a recent discussion with the Italian Foreign Minister concerning Italy's intentions regarding the outbreak of war between Austria and Serbia.

Today we discussed the question of Italy's attitude to the war. The Italian Foreign Minister told me that his government had considered the question thoroughly. It had concluded that Austria's actions against Serbia must be regarded as an act of aggression. Consequently, according to the terms of the Triple Alliance, there is no reason for Italy to support Austria. Therefore, Italy would declare itself neutral.

When I strongly opposed this point of view, the Minister stated that Italy had not been informed in advance of Austria's action against Serbia. Therefore, Italy could not be expected to take part in the war, as Italian interests were being directly damaged by the Austrian action.

The Minister stated that the Italian Government even reserved the right to decide whether it might be possible for Italy to intervene later, not on the side of the Triple Alliance but on the side of the Triple Entente*. This would only happen if, at the time of doing so, Italian interests were satisfactorily protected.

The Minister, who was very agitated, explained that the entire Italian Ministerial Council, except for himself, had shown a distinct dislike for Austria. He could not oppose the Council's attitude, because Austrian actions had gone against the terms of the Triple Alliance.

I have the impression we should not give up all hope of future Italian intervention on our side, if some reward could be offered to the Italians. Nevertheless, it is clear that Britain's influence has considerably reduced prospects of Italian participation in the war on our side.

* Triple Entente – Britain, France and Russia

Source 2: From Giovanni Giolitti, 'Memories of my Life', published in *The Living Age*, 3 February 1923. *The Living Age* was an American weekly magazine. Here Giolitti is commenting on the issues confronting Italy when a general war broke out in Europe in 1914.

Supporters of Italy entering the war argued that we should take part in the conflict immediately, because it would be short. They feared that it would end before we were ready. Thus, we might lose a magnificent opportunity to increase our national territories.

I, however, was convinced that the war would be a very prolonged one. I said it would last at least three years because it would be necessary to crush the best-organised military powers in the world. They had been preparing for war for forty years.

I emphasised how much Austria might lose by going to war with Italy. It was highly probable that we could get what we wanted from Austria by skilful negotiation. Furthermore, as the Austro-Hungarian Empire continued to suffer from the rivalry between Austria and Hungary, I believed it was sure to break up eventually. When this occurred, its Italian-speaking territories could be peaceably annexed to Italy.

Furthermore, a lengthy war required colossal financial sacrifices. It would be particularly burdensome for Italy, which possessed very little wealth, had exceptionally heavy demands upon its revenues, and was already imposing taxes as high as the people could bear.

Option 2G.2: Spain, 1930–78: republicanism, Francoism and the re-establishment of democracy

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From Jason Gurney, *Crusade in Spain*, published 1974. Gurney was a British man who held left-wing views. In December 1936, he went as a volunteer to fight for the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War. Here he comments on the situation in Spain in the last two years of the war.

It became increasingly clear that the Civil War was lost. The left wingers in Europe and America could demand that the common people of Spain should fight to the last man, but this was irresponsible. Once it had become apparent that the War could not be won, it should have been ended.

Militarily, we Republicans were outgunned and outmanoeuvred. Franco's army had professional soldiers and an overwhelming superiority of technical equipment. In street fighting, we had proven in Madrid that the fanatical heroism of our workers' battalions could hold back Franco's infantry, even though it was supported by German artillery and Italian tanks and aircraft in huge quantities. However, when it came to set-piece battles, we were no match for the Nationalist rebels. Madrid still held, but the northern sectors had been over-run. Consequently, Franco could now concentrate his entire force on the Central Fronts.

Politically, the situation had become desperate. President Azaña had been indecisive. The Republican Government in Valencia no longer represented the will of the people. Prime Minister Caballero had been forced to resign as he would not agree to the destruction of the POUM*. The Government was totally dependent on Russia for its supply of arms, with the result that the Communist Party had total control of the political structure within the Republic. Then Negrín was appointed Prime Minister on the instructions of the Communist Party. It was typical of his arrogance that he believed that he was making use of the Communist Party when, in fact, they were using him.

*POUM – The Workers' Party of Marxist Unification, a communist party that opposed Stalin's brand of communism

Source 4: From a speech made by Juan Negrín, former Prime Minister of Republican Spain, to the Council on Foreign Relations, 8 May 1939. The Council on Foreign Relations was an independent US organisation that provided information for US government departments. Here Negrín comments on the issues of military supply during the Civil War.

We lost the War because of our great inferiority in military resources. We were unable to obtain sufficient resources because of the non-intervention agreement. Our opponents were able to receive all they wanted from Germany and Italy. But our government, which was recognised as legitimate by the democracies, was obliged to get what it could in secret, as if we were criminals. From Russia? Yes indeed!

Now let me remind you of some simple facts that are all on the record. One of them is this: the first Italian and German resources reached Franco in July 1936, ten days after the war began. The first Russian resources reached us in October 1936. As you know, the non-intervention agreement had denied us our right to buy arms for the defence of democracy. Russia restored that right to us.

We received Russian help that was crucial, but we were never able to achieve even equality in resources with the Nationalist rebels. We were grateful to receive Russian pilots but that was months after German and Italian pilots had been devastating Spain.

Someday, there may be a rude awakening, and Britain and France will look for help from the very people whom they helped to destroy through non-intervention.

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Acknowledgements:

Source 1 from: https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Italian_Declaration_of_Neutrality

Source 2 from: https://www.unz.com/print/LivingAge-1923feb03-00255

Source 3 from: https://spartacus-educational.com/TUgurneyJ.htm

Source 4 from: https://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/7209