Pearson Edexcel Level 3 GCE

Friday 9 June 2023

Afternoon (Time: 1 hour 30 minutes)

Paper reference **9HI0/2F**

History

Advanced

PAPER 2: Depth study

Option 2F.1: India, c1914–48: the road to independence

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources Booklet

Do not return this Booklet with the question paper.

Turn over ▶

P72259A

©2023 Pearson Education Ltd.
N:1/1/1/1/1/1/

P 7 2 2 5 9 A

Pearson

Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 2F.1: India, c1914–48: the road to independence

Sources for use with Question 1.

Source 1: From a note written by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, about the Simla Conference, 15 July 1945. It was circulated to the British Cabinet, as a secret document, by the Secretary of State for India, 8 August 1945.

On 14 July, I made a short statement at the end of the Simla Conference. I reviewed the proceedings, explained how the failure of the Conference had occurred, and said that I must take time to consider what should be done. When all the leaders had spoken, the proceedings ended. They were less heated than I expected.

During the conference, I had talks with Jinnah, Gandhi, Azad* and Nehru. Gandhi, in spite of his great influence, is not capable of achieving a communal settlement. I doubt if he could ever think in terms of genuine co-operation with Muslims – other than those who are members of Congress. Jinnah is narrow-minded and arrogant and is driven by fear and distrust of Congress. Like Gandhi, Jinnah is incapable of friendly co-operation with the opposing party. Azad is an old-fashioned scholar with pleasant manners, but I doubt if he contributes very much to Congress policy. Nehru is an idealist, and, I feel, straight and honest.

The immediate cause of the failure of the Conference was Jinnah's inflexibility about Muslim representation and Muslim safeguards. The deeper cause was the real distrust of most Muslims for Congress and for Hindus. The Muslims have a genuine fear that Congress, by claiming to represent everyone and containing only a token few Muslims, will dominate the entire administration of any united India. This cannot be dismissed merely as an obsession of Jinnah and his closest allies.

*Azad – President of Congress and a Muslim who believed in Hindu-Muslim unity

Source 2: From Miriam Farley, *The Simla Conference*, published 15 August 1945. Farley was an American researcher. She wrote this article for an international organisation that provided opportunities for the investigation and discussion of problems facing countries in Asia and the Pacific.

Lord Wavell is reliably reported to have urged the British Government to make a new offer to India, despite strong opposition from some officials in London. On 11 June, Lord Wavell and the British Government simultaneously announced a new offer to India. Although it did not differ fundamentally from the Cripps offer, it was more flexible, and more specific as regards immediate steps.

There were some small, but distinct, improvements over the Cripps proposals. However, while the new offer called for reorganising the membership of the Viceroy's Executive Council, it did not contain any hint of an increase in the Council's powers. In 1942, this had been the crucial issue for Congress.

The Conference assembled on 25 June. According to press reports, the general terms of the British offer were accepted as a basis for discussion. However, it proved impossible to take the first step because, as we know from his public statement, Mr. Jinnah insisted on prior acceptance of the Muslim League's right to name all Muslim members of the new Executive Council. Such a demand is difficult to justify.

When Lord Wavell announced that the Conference had failed, he made a public statement. He took all blame upon himself, warned against recrimination, and left the door open for further moves, although his tone was not very hopeful.

Option 2F.2: South Africa, 1948–94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From F W de Klerk, *The Last Trek – A New Beginning, The Autobiography*, published 1998. Here he is recalling the speech that he made to the South African Parliament, 2 February 1990, in which he announced his decision to unban opposition groups and free Nelson Mandela.

I awoke with a sense of destiny. I knew that my speech would begin a new era. I could not be sure of the success of my government's initiative. The test would be the reaction of the media, the leaders whom we wanted to involve in negotiations, the international community and the public.

Half my speech would be in English and half in Afrikaans – but I decided to make the announcements that I knew would have the greatest local and foreign impact in English.

When I made the most important announcements in the speech, there was clear support and excitement from the ranks of the National Party, the Democratic Party and the members of the Coloured and Indian chambers. The only dissenting voices came from the Conservative Party.

I had achieved my objective of convincing both friends and foes that the National Party had made a fundamental policy shift.

The one matter that had raised the greatest expectations, and that I had deliberately played down in my speech, was the release of Nelson Mandela. It was crucially important that the fundamental decisions we had taken should not be overshadowed by an announcement on Mandela's release.

During my first meetings with Mandela after his release, we accepted one another's integrity. We realised that we both bore the responsibility for ensuring that there would be a negotiated settlement and we were both committed to carrying it out.

Source 4: From Hugo Young, *Frontiers of a New Land*, published 1990. Young was a journalist for the left-leaning British newspaper, *The Guardian*. He wrote this report following a visit to South Africa three months after Mandela was released.

I was sceptical of British claims that a meeting between President de Klerk and Mrs Thatcher* in June 1989 was of crucial importance. A week in South Africa showed me its importance. Thatcher explained to de Klerk that she couldn't keep up her anti-sanctions position for ever. Unless there was some reform, South African society would only be sustainable using armed force. De Klerk had the courage and intelligence to get the message.

De Klerk's shift in policy has not been a vast political risk. It has its white supporters. Moving to end apartheid is a relief to a lot of modern Afrikaner politicians, who are now prepared to confess that they have been unhappy with it for years.

De Klerk has finally wiped out the ideology of white supremacy. Some people are naïve enough to think that this automatically means the agreed end of white domination. That's far from certain.

De Klerk says that constitutional apartheid will soon be entirely eliminated. My reporting shows that actual apartheid, petty or grand, is far from gone. The promises about the laws remain to be fulfilled in practice. However, this modest start, with little given away, has already done a lot for South Africa's image. Its status as an outcast nation is ending.

***Mrs Thatcher – the British prime minister**

BLANK PAGE

BLANK PAGE

BLANK PAGE

Acknowledgements:

Source 1 from: https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/df06517b-babc-451d-baf6-a2d4b19c1c88/e50f8653-465e-43a3-b3d2-e14e417b7809/Resources#9cab15ba-130d-44d6-8844-1b048ad619c6_en&overlay

Source 2 from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3022514.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5187_SYC-5188%2Ftest&refreqid=fastly-default%3A088a40d1196a72916329d3d027c94f11

Source 3 from: The Last Trek - A New Beginning, The Autobiography By F W de Klerk © Macmillan, 1998

Source 4 from: Altered State: South Africa By The Guardian © Fourth Estate, 1990