Pearson Edexcel Level 3 GCE

Time 1 hour 30 minutes

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History

Advanced

PAPER 2: Depth study

Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774–99

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Sources Booklet

Do not return this Booklet with the question paper.

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Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 2C.1: France in revolution, 1774–99

Sources for use with Question 1.

Source 1: From the Marquis de Bouillé, *Memoirs relating to the French Revolution*, published 1797. Bouillé was a French general and a committed royalist who helped to plan the flight to Varennes. Here he reflects on the King's flight to Varennes.

> The King often told me he felt disgust at the thought of leaving France to put himself at the head of an army or ordering his troops against his own rebellious people.
>
> I never knew what course of action the King would have adopted at Montmédy* and what his conduct would have been in relation to the Assembly in such difficult circumstances. Anyone who knew the King's religious character could not doubt that, in taking his oath to uphold the Constitution, his intention was to observe the Constitution scrupulously and implement the laws it contained. But this Constitution was so imperfect, it was impossible to uphold and implement it.
>
> I had, therefore, to suppose that once the King had recovered his liberty, he would have based his conduct on the mood of the people and the army. The King would only have employed force if it proved impossible to come to a suitable arrangement with the Assembly. Indeed, several leading members of the Assembly wanted such an arrangement since France was drifting towards a republic they did not want and the chaos they dreaded.

*Montmédy – a pro-monarchy fortress town in north-eastern France

Source 2: From a speech made by Henri Grégoire to the National Assembly, 15 July 1791. Grégoire was a republican clergyman and a radical Jacobin. Here, he considers the King's flight to Varennes.

> Gentlemen, on this matter, I will speak according to my conscience.
> King Louis XVI, our most important public servant, abandoned his post. He acquired a false passport for himself. After the King had written to foreign powers stating that his most dangerous enemies were those who were trying to spread doubts and suspicions about the intentions of the monarch, he then proceeded to break his word. He fled Paris, leaving behind a written declaration for the French people, which, if not criminal in content, was, at the very least, contrary to the principles of our liberty. He must have been aware that his flight to Varennes exposed the nation to the dangers of civil war.
>
> And finally, if we consider the argument that he wished only to go to Montmédy, I say this: if he wanted merely to make peaceful observations to the National Assembly about its decrees, in that case, it was useless to flee from the capital. If he wanted to support his claims with military force, in that case the King's flight was a conspiracy against liberty.

Option 2C.2: Russia in revolution, 1894–1924

Sources for use with Question 2.

Source 3: From Leon Trotsky, *Lessons of October*, published 1924. Trotsky was a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee. Here he reflects on Lenin's dealings with the Central Committee in October 1917.

> Lenin's persistent, tireless and relentless pressure on the Central Committee throughout October 1917 arose from his constant fear that the Bolsheviks would allow the revolutionary moment to slip away forever. Lenin's Bolshevik critics argued that this view was nonsense and the party's influence would continue to grow. Lenin's opponents, within the senior ranks of the party, offered only indecision and delay which revealed their lack of determination and an inability to act. This was precisely the approach supported by two senior Central Committee members, Zinoviev and Kamenev. Their letter 'On the Current Situation', published on 11 October (a day after the Central Committee agreed to an armed insurrection), came out strongly against an immediate armed insurrection. Zinoviev and Kamenev sent this letter to the most important Bolshevik party organisations.
>
> Luckily, Lenin's leadership was decisively able to overcome such arguments in the Central Committee. Lenin was right – it was now or never. Owing to this alone, the Bolshevik party was able to carry out a victorious revolution in October 1917. The resolution for an armed insurrection was adopted by the Central Committee on 10 October. The pressure exerted by Lenin secured the necessary shift of opinion within the Central Committee.

Source 4: From a confidential letter written by Lenin to the Bolshevik Central Committee, 19 October 1917. Here he considers the recent actions of Zinoviev and Kamenev.

> Zinoviev's and Kamenev's statement, 'On the Current Situation', in the non-Party press, is treachery. Zinoviev attempted to defeat the Central Committee's decision for insurrection both at Sunday's meeting, where he and Kamenev secured not a single vote, and in their present letter. Kamenev and Zinoviev, who did not express their reservations in writing before the decision was taken, began to dispute the Central Committee's decision afterwards. The question of insurrection has been discussed in the Central Committee for several weeks and so Zinoviev and Kamenev could and should have raised their objections earlier.
>
> Kamenev and Zinoviev have betrayed to the Provisional Government the decision of the Central Committee on insurrection. They have also betrayed the decision to conceal (from our opponents) preparations for insurrection and the date appointed for it. By their action, these two members of the Central Committee have betrayed the interests of the workers to the capitalists. Kamenev's and Zinoviev's statement in the non-Party press is especially despicable for the additional reason that the Bolshevik party is not in a position to challenge their views openly. To do so, would do even greater damage to our cause and assist our enemies. There can and must be only one answer: an immediate decision by the Central Committee to expel both traitors.

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Acknowledgements

Source 1 from: 'Marquis de Bouillé, Memoirs relating to the French Revolution, published 1797 quoted in The French Revolution', Leonard W. Cowie, Macmillan

Source 2 from: The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook', Philip G. Dwyer and Peter McPhee (eds.), Routledge 2002

Source 3 from: https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/lessons/

Source 4 from: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/oct/19.htm