Pearson Edexcel Level 3 GCE

Wednesday 24 May 2023

Morning (Time: 2 hours 15 minutes)

Paper reference **9HI0/1E**

History

Advanced

PAPER 1: Breadth study with interpretations

Option 1E: Russia, 1917–91: from Lenin to Yeltsin

Extracts Booklet

Do not return this Booklet with the question paper.

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Extracts for use with Section C.

Extract 1: From David R Marples, *The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985–1991*, published 2004.

Gorbachev's most important failure was not to reconcile the results of *glasnost* with the rise of the national question in the Soviet Union. Problems in the republics emerged almost immediately upon his taking office and were only increased by the more tolerant atmosphere within the media. In the Baltic states, there were widespread protests. Arguably Gorbachev could have negotiated the departure of the three Baltic states from the USSR and still maintained the union. His hesitation ensured that the initiatives of the Baltic leaders, and particularly the popular fronts, spread to the other republics.

The rise in national sentiment in the republics received a significant boost from the downfall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In the first instance, Gorbachev's abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine led to the overthrow of the obsolete communist governments in Poland and East Germany, which had almost no popular support. When the Soviet Union did not respond to stop the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Soviet republics could act with more confidence.

Extract 2: From John Keep, *A History of the Soviet Union 1945–1991*, published 1995.

Gorbachev's miscalculations were so enormous that some contemporary observers thought they might be 'deliberate mistakes'. In other words, that he was following a secret agenda and was working to bring down the Soviet regime. First, he authorised the spending spree of 1985–86, which undermined the country's financial stability. The financial stability of the Soviet Union was already more seriously threatened than he realised since his predecessors had treated financial matters as top-secret.

Second, he underestimated the seriousness of nationalist tensions within the Soviet Union which could not be easily resolved by the rational, common sense methods he applied. Third, although he believed that the socialist option was irreversible, he weakened the party machinery that embodied it.

Finally, in 1990, he refused to endorse the programme of his adviser Shatalin for transition to a free market. All of these miscalculations were rooted in a failure to appreciate the true nature of the Soviet political system, which, being totalitarian, was held together ultimately by coercion and deceitful propaganda.

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Acknowledgments

Extract 1 from: Russia 1917-91: From Lenin to Yeltsin By Robin Bunce & David R Marples © Hodder Education, 2017

Extract 2 from: A History of the Soviet Union 1945 – 1991 By John L. H. Keep © Oxford University Press, September 2002